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ABSTRACT

Candidate Ideology and Small Donor Contributions
by
Ryan Kobe, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Dr. Michael Lyons
Department: Political Science
While individual contributors are the biggest source of campaign fundraising,
previous research has focused on individuals donating over the reporting limit of $200.
With the emergence of publicly available data on individual contributors who donate
under $200, and as these donors become more significant in congressional fundraising, a
new analysis of donor motivations is needed. This thesis investigates if and how
candidate ideology is related to amount contributed. Specifically, I query whether the
dollar amount of contributions changes depending on the extremity of candidate
ideology. These results have important implications for campaign financing reforms and
for candidate positioning strategies.

(44 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Candidate Ideology and Small Donor Contributions
Ryan Kobe

While individual citizens are the biggest source of campaign fundraising in Senate
and House elections, previous research has focused on individuals donating over the
reporting limit of $200. The Federal Elections Committee now makes available data on
individuals who donate less than $200, and as these donors take on a bigger role in
congressional fundraising, a new analysis of donor motivations is needed. This thesis
investigates if and how candidate ideology is related to amount contributed. Specifically,
I ask whether the dollar amount of contributions changes depending on how conservative
or liberal a candidate is. These results have important implications for campaign
financing reforms and for candidate positioning strategies.
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1
Candidate Ideology and Small Donor Contributions

Introduction
Campaign fundraising and its impact on the political landscape have created a
vast breadth of political science scholarship. However, there are still large and important
gaps within this area of research that need to be explored. Much of the literature
surrounding campaign fundraising has focused on the influence of Political Action
Committees (PACs) working for corporate and labor interests and that of court decisions
like Citizens United (e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Gopoian, 1984; Poole et al., 1987;
Grier and Munger, 1993; Romer and Snyder 1994; McCarty and Poole, 1998). The role
of these groups is important, especially given the presumed ideological leaning of such
organizations, but the role of the individual contributor who may also be heavily bound
by ideology, should also be explored.
The role of the small donor is even more understudied, largely due to a lack of
high-quality and publicly available data. This lack of research is problematic, especially
since the role of the small donor has become increasingly impactful. In 2008, Barack
Obama’s primary campaign against Hilary Clinton was boosted by a fundraising haul in
January 2007 of $16 million dollars in individual contributions of less than $200
(Campaign Finance Institute, 2008). Bernie Sanders (I-VT) raised over $34.5 million
dollars from 1.8 million individual small donors during the fourth quarter of 2019 in a bid
for the Democratic nomination (Nilsen, 2020).
In what was a presidential election anomaly, small donors have become
significant in both congressional and state elections. In the 2018 midterm elections,
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Democratic Senate candidates raised 27% of their war chests from small donors and
Democratic House candidates raised 16% (Pildes, 2019). In 2020, small donors made up
22% of total campaign fundraising, a sizable jump from 2016’s 15% (Gratzinger, 2020).
The first goal of this paper is to critically examine the pattern between individual
campaign contributions donated to a Senate candidate and the ideology of that candidate
in the 2018 election cycle. The second goal is to query the connection between the
number of individual contributions made to a candidate and the ideology of each
candidate. As such there must be an exploration of the theoretical reason why small
donors would exhibit different behavior than those donating large amounts.

A Brief History of Campaign Finance Literature
Previous theories regarding campaign finance have involved the relationship
between financial contributions and the policy positions adopted by candidates (Hall &
Deardorff, 2006; Morton & Cameron, 1992). This fits in with the quid pro quo model of
campaign contributors proposed by Welch (1974, 1980), who proposed that donors are
investing in a candidate with the goal of winning influence and favors from the winning
candidate. The other major influential model of campaign contributions is an ideological
model. Instead of donations acting as an investment in future policy, this model suggests
that individuals donate to candidates who already share their ideology, with the goal of
changing the ideological makeup of Congress and the future policy they create (Barber,
2016).
Snyder (1990,1993) finds that PACS and organizations also follow the quid pro
quo model while individuals follow an ideological pattern. One of the key assumptions of
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the ideological model is that individual donors must have some knowledge of policy
differences between candidates and as such make decisions based off that knowledge.
This assumption is complicated, since political science scholarship suggests that voters
are overwhelmingly uneducated about policy (e.g., Bartels, 1996; Caplan, 2008; Lau &
Redlawsk, 1997; Lewis-Beck et al., 2014). Voters have shown a pattern of punishing
incumbents when they increase the extent to which they voted with the extreme of their
party, suggesting that voters dislike partisanship in their representatives and that they
have some knowledge of congressional action (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002).
One argument over the likelihood of a candidate adopting polarized policy
positions is that while it benefits them with fundraising goals, it may also increase
counter-mobilization efforts (Cameron and Enelow, 1992). Large fundraising gains allow
candidates to attract new support and potential voters, countering the potential cost of
adopting more polarized policy positions (Aldrich, 1983, 1995; Moon, 2004).
Literature has found that individual donors are more likely to donate to candidates
who fit their ideological paradigm and reward candidates whose position moves closer to
their own ideology (Barber, 2016). In 2012, 40% of individual financial contributions for
Senate candidates came from out-of-state donors, suggesting that donorship is not
reflective of a desire for access but instead of influencing the makeup of Congress
entirely or to support their political “team” (e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Rhodes et al.,
2018; Barber et al., 2016).
Individual donors enjoy emotional benefits through participation, otherwise
known as the consumptive model of donor motivation (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder, 2003). Additionally, donors give to candidates who they identify with, because

4
they are motivated by an ideological sameness, which may be an understudied aspect of
identity politics (Bonica, 2014; Ensley 2009; McCarty et al., 2016). Small donors
specifically are thought to be emotionally motivated because they have no reasonable
expectation of a return on this investment, since a small donation is unlikely to endear
them to their preferred candidate or give them access to that candidate (Francia et al.,
2003; Pangopoulos & Bergan, 2006).
La Raja and Schaffner suggest that there is little difference between the
motivations of large and small donors, instead differentiating them by the frequency of
their donations. As such they suggest that individuals who contribute frequently are less
likely to be ideologically motivated or to have extreme partisan beliefs (2015). This may
be reversed for small donors, however, with individuals setting up recurring small
donations to politicians who share their ideology or represent a “genre” of politician they
want to support (Rhodes et al., 2018).
Bonica and Shen’s model separates donors into four types: party-oriented donors,
local-oriented donors, idiosyncratic donors and nationalized donors. Those who fit into
the nationalized donor class are wealthier and donate more frequently to out-of-district
candidates, potentially securing “surrogate representation” from a variety of
Congressmen (Bonica & Shen, 2014). This fits into the consumption framework of
political contributions, since they expect a return on their investment. This theory
assumes that small donor behavior follows the same pattern as large donors, in which
there is another nationalized donor class made up of middle-class individuals seeking
representation from a variety of members (Montemayor et al., 2020).
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Since existing theories of individual giving are quite limited, political scientists
have been studying new models of campaign donors. Francia et al. suggest that there are
three major reasons that an individual would donate to a political campaign: purposive
incentives, solidary incentives and material incentives (2003). As noted above, material
incentives refer to the idea that an individual is donating in order to receive some sort of
personal gain (Hall & Wayman, 1990). Material gains are commonly believed to be the
main reason for individual contribution, as cited by public opinion polls and other survey
methods (Confessore & Thee-Brenan, 2015). But this is simply not a viable explanation
for the small donor.
One solution to this issue is the solidary incentive, or the psychological benefits
that individuals feel as a result of political participation (Francia et al., 2003). One
definition of solidary incentives define them as perceived social benefits that come from
participating in activities such as fundraising dinners and meet and greets with politicians
and celebrities. This is an unlikely incentive for those donating a few dollars, since most
events are significantly more expensive. But this could explain small donations following
public rallies and town halls. The most important aspect is that small donor contributions
are most common through digital platforms meaning that the social benefit is quite
limited.
There are a variety of incentive models of campaign fundraising that people
consider removed from ideology. Hamlin and Jennings (2011) theorize that individuals
donate to certain candidates in order to “express” their political beliefs, not as a
mechanism of securing representation. Expressive incentives are not actually distinct
from ideology, as ideology would fit within the belief the donor was trying to express.
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The rational choice model seems in opposition to small donor contributions, since
a small donation is unlikely to sway the race or win any direct influence over the political
makeup of government. This is compounded when the perceived cost for the small donor
is quite high, since a ten-dollar donation may actually equate to a bigger percentage of an
individual’s income than that of $2000 for a wealthy individual. Rational choice seems to
suggest that a donor is unlikely to contribute any money without “real” incentives, thus
making it difficult to reconcile the existence of the small donor at all (e.g., Aldrich, 1993;
Downs, 1957; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968).
Other research proposes that individual contributors are even more ideological
than voters who participate in primary elections and that those who donate the smallest
amounts may be even more prone to polarization than larger donors (Pildes, 2019).
Whether this is an accurate framework greatly impacts the future political landscape, in
part due to their greater influence and through potential legislation. By investing their
hard-earned money in elections, the average American is investing more in governmental
outcomes. This has the potential to create even more generalized cynicism of
government, because that money may not affect the outcome of an election and the
donors may not see any tangible results from their contributions.
This could be compounded if some of the proposals currently sitting in Congress
become law. In 2021, House Democrats introduced the “For the People Act” (H.R. 1) as
a way of encouraging small donor fundraising. The goal of H.R. 1 is to make it easier to
vote in federal elections, to end congressional gerrymandering, to overhaul current
federal finance laws, and to safeguard against foreign interference. However, one aspect
that may have far-reaching consequences is Title V – Campaign Finance Empowerment.
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The goal of these provisions is to counter the perceived negative effects of Citizens
United by empowering small donors through matching donations in a 6:1 ratio up to 250
million dollars per candidate. This has the potential to result in an even more polarized
Congress if small donors support primarily ideologically extreme candidates.

An Ideological Theory of Small Donor Motivation
There is a theoretical justification for different behaviors among different donor
classes. People who are affluent enough to donate large amounts of money may be
socialized to think of both politics and political contributions differently (Chubb & Moe,
1988; Conover, 1991; Niemi & Sobieszek, 1977). They are more likely to be male, white,
and upper class, and as such are more likely to financially support candidates who they
believe represent them, whether that is because they are also white and male or whether
they offer policy platforms that benefit that social class (Mayersohn, 2015). When
individuals donate large amounts to candidates, they are investing in that specific
candidate with the expectation of some physical return, instead of the goal of altering the
ideological makeup of Congress. Small donors are more likely to be more diverse in
gender, race, and socio-economic class (Albert & La Raja, 2020).
The consumption model of contribution states that people donate in order to help
their political team or to show support for their political preference. In short, this means
that donors are not investing in specific policies or candidates, they are investing in the
ideological future of Congress (La Raja & Wiltse, 2012; Culberson et al., 2018; Johnson,
2013). If they were, they would donate to races that the candidate they support actually
has a chance of winning, where their money would make the most difference, or to push a
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candidate to adopt a policy they prefer. Bouton et al. argue that electoral incentives are a
major concern for small donors and offer as evidence that as the closeness of an election
increases, so do individual contributions (2018).
Large donors contribute money primarily toward incumbents (Culberson,
McDonald and Robbins, 2014), but there is little evidence to suggest that small donors
act similarly. Incumbents have a fundraising advantage when running for re-election
(Abramowitz, 1991), so the fact that small donors are equally likely to donate to
opponents or incumbents means that this incumbency advantage may become less
important. Research suggests that incumbent’s ability to raise large amounts of money
intimidate challengers from entering the race, thus creating another barrier to high quality
challengers that may be mitigated by a greater reliance on small donors (BoxSteffensmeier, 1996; Epstein & Zemsky, 1995). This is up for some debate, and may
depend on a variety of external variables (Goodlife, 2001).
Small donors may be drawn to underdog candidates, people like Amy McGrath in
Kentucky or Jamie Harrison in South Carolina; charismatic politicians, but running as
Democrats in historically deep red states. It is likely that these donors were not motivated
by those specific candidates, but instead by the circumstances surrounding them. The
weekend after Ruth Bader Ginsburg died in September, ActBlue processed over 100
million dollars in small dollar donations, much of which went to candidates like McGrath
and Harrison (Lyons, 2020). During this fundraising blitz, donations came primarily from
out-of-state, meaning the biggest potential benefit to these left leaning donors was to
punish incumbents like Mitch McConnell and Lindsey Graham for voting to replace
Ginsburg with a conservative justice.

9
Furthermore, new developments in digital fundraising can open the door to a
larger audience of new donors, including a younger and less wealthy “donor class”
(Culberson et al., 2018). These donors may only contribute small amounts each election
cycle but when this pattern is generalized to a large breadth of Americans, this money can
impact election outcomes. The internet makes it incredibly low cost to donate to
candidates without any prior knowledge or exposure to said candidate. ActBlue and
WinRed allow you to save your credit card information, so, while you are scrolling
Twitter or Instagram, in two clicks you can get to a candidate’s fundraising page. It is
simple, requires no information, and takes very little time, which may offer insight as to
why small dollar donors exist despite rational choice arguing that they should not (Riker
& Ordeshook, 1968).
Previous research on donor behavior has been limited by data availability and as
such has focused on either survey data (which comes with a large amount of bias and
uncertainty) or on the behavior of individuals who contribute over the federally mandated
reporting limit. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) only requires the donor and the
receiving candidate to publicly disclose the contributor’s identifying information and the
amount donated if they have donated more than $200.
While the FEC does not require campaigns to disclose these donations, they do
have a significant listing of these small donors through campaign aggregators like
WinRed and ActBlue who report all donations, including those of as little as .19 cents.
Many campaigns utilize aggregators, and it is becoming increasingly more common for
campaigns to report all donations they receive rather than separate out those over 200
dollars. This project uses that information to examine what candidates are more likely to
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receive funds from small donors and whether those donations have a cohesive pattern, or
that:
H1 : In comparing individuals, those who are donating to candidates who are
more ideologically extreme give less money than donors who are giving to candidates
with more moderate ideology.

Methods
To test whether small donors donate more money to highly ideological
candidates, I gathered publicly available data from the FEC. This dataset includes all
individual contributions to Senate candidates from 2017-2018. Campaign aggregators
report all contributions to the FEC even if they do not meet the $200 reporting limit,
allowing for research differentiating the behavior of large and small donors. While this
dataset may not be comprehensive in listing every small dollar donation to every single
Senate candidate from 2017 to 2018, it results in the vast majority of contributions. The
dataset includes over 1 million individual contributions, with 792,868 contributions under
$200.
The dependent variable for this analysis is the dollar amount contributed to each
candidate in the 2018 election from individual citizens as reported by the Federal
Election Commission. This variable ranges from an individual contribution of .19 cents to
the federal limit of $2300 to 162 different Senate candidates. Due to time constraints, this
analysis counts each contribution as its own observation, it does not separate out those
individuals who donated to the same candidate multiple times or to different candidates’
multiple times. This is unfortunate, but because individuals frequently fill out identifying
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information multiple times and due to spelling changes and mistakes, identifying these
donors as one observation proved to be beyond the time frame of this analysis.
The primary independent variable for this analysis is a candidate’s ideology. Most
commonly used measures of candidate ideology utilize roll call votes, meaning that a
candidate has to have held federal office in order to have a quantifiable score. For
candidates who have not held office previously, this measurement becomes much more
complicated. Researchers who seek an answer to this dilemma utilize different methods
including Project Vote Smart (Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr, and Steward, 2001), candidate
state legislative voting records (Shor and McCarty, 2011), a candidate’s Twitter
following (Barberá, 2015), campaign donor information and a multitude of other options.
All come with serious considerations and make certain assumptions that may or may not
hold true under examination. Tausanovitch and Warshaw find that all options measure
domain-specific political orientations and lack strong correlation with roll call voting
patterns (2016), which further complicates analysis. As a result, Tausanovitch and
Warshaw suggest that all measures of political ideology are more accurate for Senate
candidates than for House candidates, since the Senate is more visible, more
individualistic, and less party dominated (2016).
Therefore, to account for some of the variation in ideological measures, I have
limited my analysis to Senate candidates in the 2018 midterms. The Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES) measured public perceptions of candidate ideology
for all Senate hopefuls in 2018. The 2018 CCES measured the ideology of both the
incumbent and challenger in their local Senate races according to 60,000 respondents and
ranked them on a 7-point scale from Very Liberal (1) to Very Conservative (7). These
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responses are potentially problematic since people tend to rank those who differ from
their position as more extreme than they rank themselves (Hare et al., 2015). To account
for this bias, I utilize a variable created by Kevin Reuning which standardizes the CCES
variable using the Aldrich-McKelvey scaling method. By assuming that each response is
a function of the candidate’s true ideology and that the voter’s perception of ideology
functions as a slope parameter, Reuning was able to push voters’ rankings to the left or
right (as an intercept) (Reuning, 2019). The A-M method has been utilized in a variety of
social science scholarship, including Palfrey and Poole (1987), Poole (1998), and Saiegh
(2009). This method turns the 7-point scale into a continuous variable ranging from 0
(middle of the road), 1 (slightly liberal/conservative), 2 (liberal/conservative), 3 (very
liberal/conservative) to 4 (extremist).
Campaign fundraising is affected by how competitive an election is in that close
elections draw more donations (e.g., Jacobson, 1980; Green and Krasnov, 1988; Erikson
and Palfrey, 2000; Rogers & Moore, 2014; Rogers et al., 2017). Because small donors are
thought to be less strategic and more emotional than large donors, it is probable that their
donation pattern is smaller in competitive elections (Francia et al., 2003; Pangopoulos &
Bergan, 2006). To measure the expected closeness of the race I use Cook Political
rankings to create a COMPETITIVENESS variable. There are four categories: Safe
Democrat/Republican (0), Likely Democrat/Republican (1), Lean Democrat/Republican
(3) and Tossup (4). This helps to control for incumbent’s ability to raise more money
during close elections and the strength of challengers.
I also control for individual characteristics of the candidates. This includes the
GENDER of the candidate, since there is a breadth of research suggesting female
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candidates have surpassed the fundraising capabilities of male candidates (Biersack &
Hernson, 1994; Burrell, 1985; Uhlaner & Schlozman, 1986; Wilhite & Theilmann, 1986).
Small donors are more diverse than large donors, including in gender, and may be more
likely to donate to female candidates (Albert & La Raja, 2020). INCUMBENCY
(theoretically incumbents should be better positioned to raise money, and moderate
incumbents have been shown to be strong fundraisers) (Francia et al., 2003),
LEADERSHIP (members of Senate leadership should be more visible, have higher name
ID, and should receive higher donations) (Denzau and Munger, 1986; Grier and Munger,
1991), COMMITTEE CHAIR (committee chairs are better positioned to “bring home the
bacon” as it were, an advantage for district based fundraising), and an incumbent’s ability
to gather cosponsors for legislation (SPONSOR). While incumbents have an inherent
advantage in fundraising, research shows that challengers who have held prior office are
stronger fundraisers as well (QUALITY) (Squire and Wright, 1990; Basinger and Ensley,
2007). These are all dichotomous variables, either 0 or 1, with the exception of
SPONSOR, which is measured as a continuous variable from 0.0 to 1.0 (GovTrack,
2019). I utilize three models to analyze the differences across party within this
framework.
OLS regression suited the analyzation of the relationship between the average
amount contributed and ideology, as well as the other control variables. I expect to see a
decrease in funding going towards Republican candidates who are more conservative and
towards more liberal Democratic candidates, when my other variables are held constant. I
also expect to see an increase in the amount of overall donations received by candidates
who are ideologically extreme. This is a relatively simple analysis but allows a clear
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understanding of the potential difference in donor behavior. If my hypothesis proves
correct, there will be a strong negative relationship between ideology and amount
contributed, showing that those who donate smaller amounts are more likely to support
more ideological candidates.
Results
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is a strong theoretical justification for the
belief that a relationship between ideology and campaign fundraising exists and that this
relationship is exacerbated by small donors (Francia et al., 2003; La Raja & Wiltse, 2012;
Culberson et al., 2018; Johnson, 2013). While ideology is quite difficult to measure
accurately, the A-M method allows me to scale the public’s perceived ideology score into
a standardized approximation of ideology.
In each model presented in Table 1, the ideology variable is ranged from the
weakest ideology score (0.34, candidate Chele Farley R-NY) to the most extreme
ideology score (4.38, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT)). In Table 1, I present the regression
results for the analysis of the total individual contributions to Republican and Democratic
Senate candidates in 2017-2018 as a function of the candidate’s ideology. Note that the
number of observations is significantly fewer for Republican candidates than it is for
Democratic candidates, most likely due to the strong opposition against President Trump
and the 2016-2017 Congress. You will also note that the initial datasheet included over 1
million observations, while the regression only includes a total of 679,276 individual
observations. This is due to the large number of missing observations in the control
variables.
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The first column of estimates reported in Table 1 is for all candidates regardless
of party. The coefficient for ideology is negative and statistically significant, which
indicates that the more conservative or liberal a candidate is the smaller donations they
will receive from individual contributors. The second column shows this for Republican
candidates and the third for Democratic candidates. Republican candidates receive 240
dollars less, on average, as they move one unit more conservative while Democratic
candidates receive 108 dollars less. A Democratic candidate who is four standard
deviations more liberal than baseline will have a predicted average individual
contribution of $129.00. These results further support that candidate ideology
significantly predicts individual contributions from both large and small donors.
My control variables prove statistically significant, though the substantive
interpretations are less so. My SPONSOR, QUALITY, and COMMITTEE CHAIR
variables have statistical significance, while INCUMBENCY, candidate GENDER, and
LEADERSHIP variables have lesser effects. An incumbent who serves as a committee
chair will have an average contribution of 588.78 dollars. A female Republican will
receive an average donation of $889.45, while a female Democrat will raise average
contributions of $583.83. Substantively however, an average increase of $8.00 for all
candidates or $0.54 for Democratic candidates is unlikely to sway an election. While
COMPETITIVENESS is statistically significant, it has smaller effects than the other
variables.
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Table 1
Regression Results
Amount Contributed ($)
DV
Intercept

All
482.95***
(2.88)

Republican
833.91***
(9.04)

Democrat
562.40***
(4.02)

Ideology

-67.08***
(0.78)

-240.80***
(4.39)

-108.35***
(1.13)

Competitiveness

8.57***
(0.35)

71.39***
(1.51)

.54***
(0.35)

Sponsor

-54.25***
(3.19)

125.50***
(14.68)

-118.52***
(3.29)

Incumbent

-29.06***
(2.01)

-5.63
(9.45)

3.65
(2.00)

Quality

-134.24***
(2.46)

-100.59***
(4.43)

-100.91***
(3.21)

Gender

27.91***
(0.83)

55.54***
(2.58)

21.43***
(0.87)

Leadership

0.75
(1.76)

67.54***
(2.10)

Committee Chair

134.89***
(2.92)

107.43***
(2.87)

Observations

679,276

141,697

537,579

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p< .05 ** p< 0.01 *** p < 0.001
Two-tailed test

Some of these variables suggest the opposite of previous research. Candidates
who have held prior office receive smaller average donations than those who have not.
Republicans who have more co-sponsors will raise higher average donations than
Democrats who have more co-sponsors, suggesting party specific fundraising issues. This
could be the result of 2018 environmental factors, most specifically Donald Trump’s

17
presidency and the subsequent pushback from Democrats. President Trump, despite not
being up for reelection in 2018, offered a controversial target for Democrats which, as
well as being the out of power party, gave them a distinct fundraising advantage.

Figure 1:
Predicted Donations to All Candidates

Figure 2:
Predicted Donations to Republican Candidates

Figure 3:
Predicted Donations to Democratic Candidates
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Unfortunately, there are simply not enough Republican observations to accurately
estimate the effect of Senate leadership or Committee chair, so those estimates are not
included in the final regression. For both the Democrat model and for the All model,
however, these are important control variables to include and, with more data should be
utilized for all three models.
The results presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the predicted average individual
contribution with the control variables held constant. There is a clear negative
relationship across all three models, though this effect is strongest in the Republican
model. The more conservative a Republican is, the smaller their average donation will be.
To examine this relationship further, and to check whether this smaller average donation
was countered by a greater number of donations in aggregate, I created a visualization of
the number of donations across different ideologies in Figure 4.
Figure 4:
Number of Individual Contributions Across Candidate Ideology
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There is a clear positive relationship between ideology and the amount of
donations received. While this seems to be somewhat stronger for Democratic candidates,
the overall regression shows that highly ideological candidates will receive a greater
number of overall donations. This may mean that candidates who have highly Republican
or highly Democratic ideologies compensate for their smaller average donations by
bringing in significantly more donations total.

Discussion
In this paper, I have queried the relationship between U.S. Senate candidates’
ideology and contributions from individual citizens in the 2018 election. I have used
individual level data for measuring contribution information and a scaled version of
survey level candidate data to account for measurement error. The results presented
strong evidence that small donors contribute more to highly conservative or highly liberal
candidates and that large donors contribute more to moderate candidates. These results
hold across both parties, despite it having a greater effect for Republican candidates.
These findings hold when a variety of control variables are utilized in the model.
This is a significant finding because it has implications for how candidates may
position or choose to position their policy platforms. If a candidate adopts more extreme
policy positions, they may be in turn be able to generate a greater amount of small dollar
donations despite them potentially losing out on big money. Further, given that individual
donations are the largest single source of contributions for candidates and the legislation
currently in debate for matching small donor contributions, this effect may become even
more pronounced in future elections.
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A potential limitation of this research is the selection bias inherent in my
dependent variable. While the FEC has a large number of observations from small
donors, they are present due to campaign aggregators reporting them, which means that
they are not representative of all small donations. Older people may be less likely to be
included, since they historically have donated money through physical checks or other
offline mechanisms. There is also the possibility that the skew towards Democratic
donations is not just because of anti-Trump sentiment but also due to ActBlue being older
and more used than WinRed. WinRed was started in 2019, as a response to the success of
ActBlue, which was started in 2004. The integration of ActBlue into most, if not all,
Democratic campaigns is more complete than that of WinRed. There is also the fact that
online individual donations from Republicans are less common for two reasons: the GOP
base is trends older and donates more by mail and the GOP is more reliant on big
donations from businesses and PACs (Torres, 2020). Because my dataset only includes
observations for those who have donated money, there is some affecting my results. This
is limited because the focus of this project is comparing the actions of those who donate
large amounts compared to those who donate small amounts, but that bias should still be
noted.
If our goal is to understand the impact of money in elections, we cannot only
center the role of corporate financing. Instead, future research must also look into the
donors that are funding campaigns on single digit donations and the effects of same. This
thesis is a small but necessary step in this critical direction.
Future research should seek to generalize this finding across multiple years and
measures of ideology. Further, political scientists must combat the drawbacks of
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measuring ideology and create better measurements of ideology. We need to consider
whether there is more than one dimension of campaign fundraising. We should examine
the intersection of ideology and identity, for example, are certain types of candidates
rewarded for having strong ideological positions while others are punished. Does this
finding depend on what conservative-liberal issue is being raised, or are more
controversial cultural issues like gun control and abortion access a better barometer for
explaining a candidate’s fundraising success compared to traditional social welfare
issues? Do incumbents who become more ideological follow this trend or are they
punished for a lack of loyalty to their original donors?
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